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NOTES
LIABILITY OF PROMOTERS FOR PROMOTION PROFITS-This field
of the law bristles with complexity. An attemptI to unravel its
intricacies finds sanction in the importance of the questions involved
and in the irreconcilable conflict of opinion which at present exists
upon the subject. The situation to be investigated is that in which
a person turns over property to a corporation which he forms for
that purpose, at a price greater than he paid for it, and brings in, as
originally contemplated members, persons not cognizant of the facts,
so that their money may pay all the expenses of the promotion, and
make his profit real.
The basic factor in the problem is that the rights of three persons are involved, two natural, the promoter and the member, and one
artificial, the corporation. Two questions seem to constitute the whole
inquiry: to whom, if any one, are the promotion profits inequitable;
and, has the artificial or natural person to whom they were inequitable
condoned the wrong? The purpose of this note is to set forth the
manner in which the present law answers these questions, and to
suggest that they should be answered quite differently.

THE PRESENT LAW
The Inequity of Promotion Profits

The premise of the present law appears to be that a promoter
is a fiduciary. The fact that the promoter profited, often enormously,
seemed sufficient, to most courts, to make such profits inequitable, and
to give ample reason for crowding the recipient thereof into the ranks
of fiduciaries. Having made so little injuiry as to why the profit was
inequitable, confusion regarding the person to whom this fiduciary
duty was owed was the natural result. Pennsylvania early determined
that it was owed directly to the members, both present and future.2
'Yet the attempt is temerarious, both in that it advances a solution totally
devoid of judicial authority, and in that the problem has been analyzed more than
once in the past by writers of recognized authority. BALLANTIN-E, CoRPoRATIONS

(1927)

§ 13o;

174 et seq.; EHRICH, THE LAW OF PROMOTERS (1916)

Weston, Promoter's Liability: Old Dominion v. Bigelow (1916) 30 HARV. L.
RZv. 39; Isaacs, The Promoter, A Legislative Problem (1925) 38 ibid. 887;
Little, Promoter's Fraudsin the Organicationof Corporations: The Old Dominion Copper Mining Cases (1910) 5 ILL. L. REv. 87. Nor is this list exhaustive.
2
Mr. Justice Sharswood, in Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 (187o)
at 49-50, states that there are two principles: "The first is, that any man or
number of men, who are the owners of . . . property, may form

.

.

[an]

association with others, and sell that property to the association at any price
which may be agreed upon between them, no matter what it may have originally
cost, provided there be no fraudulent misrepresentation made by the vendors
. . . The second . . . is, that where persons form such an association, or
(66r)
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A numerically strong line of cases found it to be to the corporation,
but primarily for the benefit of the members. 3 Three very famous
cases conceived that it was owed to the corporation directly and for
its own benefit, qua corporation. 4 These cases did not agree among
themselves as to whether there was also a duty to the members individually. One intimated that there was none,5 but the other two
dealt with the cases before them without prejudice to the existence
of such a duty.'
On the other hand, comparatively recently, some few courts have
not been satisfied that taking a promotion profit is necessarily inequibegin or start the project of one, from that time they do stand in a confidential
relation to each other, and to all others who may subsequently become members

or subscribers . . ."
Accord: Burbank v. Dennis, lol Cal. 90, 35 Pac. 444 (1894) ; CaliforniaCalaveras Mining Co. v. Walls, 170 Cal. 285, 149 Pac. 595 (1915); Victor Oil
Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 193 Pac. 243 (192o).
Cf. Hayward v. Leeson, 176

Mass. 310, 318, 57 N. E. 656, 66o (igoo) ; Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3 App. Cas. 1218, 1255 (1878), s.c., 5 Ch. Div. 73, I13, 323 (1877) ;
In re British Seamless Paper Box Co. 17 Ch. Div. 467, 471, 479 (1881) ; In. re
Olympia [188] 2 Ch. 153, 177, s. c. sub nominw, Gluckstein v. Barnes [19oo] A.
C. 240, 257; In re Leeds and Hanley Theatres of Varieties Ltd. [i9o2]

2

Ch.

8og, 823; see also Weston, op cit. supra note 1,at 53 et seq.
'Yeiser v. U. S. Board & Paper Co., lO7 Fed. 340 (C.C. A. 6th, igoi);
Tilden v. Barber, 268 Fed. 587 (D. C.N. J. 9-o) ; Frame v. Mahoney, 21 Ariz.
282, 187 Pac. 584 (592o) ; Hughes v. Cadena De Cobre Mining Co., 13 Ariz. 52,
lo8 Pac. 231 (191o); Hinkley v. Sac Oil and Pipe Line Co., 132 Iowa 396, 1O7
N. W. 629 (igoi) ; Mason v. Carrothers, 1O5 Me. 392, 74 Atl. 1030 (9o9);

American Forging Co. v. Wiley, 2o6 Mich. 664, 173 N. W. 515 (1gg) ; Macey
Co. v. Macey, 143 Mich. 138, lo6 N. W. 722, 5 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1036 (1go6);

South Joplin Land Co.v. Case, 104 Mo. 572, 16 S. W. 390 (i8g1); Pietsch v.
Milbrath, x23 Wis. 647, 102 N. W. 342 (19o4); Pittsburgh Mining Co. v.
Spooner, 74 Wis. 307, 42 N. W. 259 (1889).

'Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3 App; Cas. 1218 (1878)
especially at 1236; Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v.
Lewisohn, 23o U. S. 2o6, 28 Sup. Ct. 634 (i9o8) (this theory is the implicit basis of the opinion); Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 176-196, 89 N. E. 193, 2o6-2o8, 4o L. R. A.
(. s.) 314, 332-336 (igog). See also Bigelow v. Old Dominion, etc., Co., 74
N. J. Eq. 457, 505, 71 Atl. 153, 173 (loO8). It has been said that Davis v. Las
Ovas Co., 227 U. S. 8o, 33 Sup. Ct 197 (1913) "may be regarded in the future as
overruling" the Lewisohn case. Note (1926) 26 CoL L. REv. 447, at 453;
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927)
378, n. 6o. This statement seems unwarranted. However, it is true that it overruled one ground of the Lewisohn case,
and, in view of its language, it may be true that the Supreme Court is veering
away from the "duty to the corporation for its own benefit" theory, for the court
says, 227 U. S. at 86, 33 Sup. Ct., at 199, "The original fraud practiced upon some
of those associated with them [the defendants] in the promoters' arrangement
became operative against the corporation itself. The standing of the corporation results from the fact that there were innocent and deceived members of the
corporation when the property was taken over by it."
'Old Dominion, etc., Co. v. Bigelow, supra note 4, 203 Mass. at 192, 89 N.
E. at 2o8, 4o L. R. A. (N. s.) at 334.
'Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., supra note 4, 3 App. Cas. at
1264; Old Dominion, etc., Co.v. Lewisohn, supra note 4, 210 U. S. at 213, 28 Sup.
Ct. at 636.
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table, to the corporation at least.7 Thus, in the recent case of Henderson v. Plymouth Oil Co..8 which is typical of this class, the Supreme
Court of Delaware refused recovery on a representative bill based on
the theory that the promoters' profits were inequitable to the corporation, when it found that the property was, at the time of the transfer,
worth the price the corporation paid for it.
Condonation
Though almost all courts hold that a promoter is a fiduciary,
they agree that, no matter how wrongful the promoter's profits were
when he took them, he may keep them if the person to whom he owes
the fiduciary duty assents thereto. This question of so-called condonation has engaged the very serious attention of the courts. Indeed the
usual approach of the courts to promoter cases is to gloss over the
question whether it is inequitable for a promoter to profit, and consequently whether he should be a fiduciary, and to plunge into the
problem of condonation. This investigation will be confined to those
jurisdictions which hold that the duty is to the corporation, since they
are the most important and the most numerous. No distinction need
be made in respect of condonation between the view that the duty is
to the corporation for its own benefit and the one that the duty is to
the corporation for the benefit of its members, for the problem is the
same under either view. The two leading cases in this connection reveal radically different theories as to when the corporation assents.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn,9 held that where all those
who were members when the transaction was entered into knew all
the facts and assented, the corporation assented and condoned, and
was forever precluded from objecting. It was so held notwithstanding that the promoter then intended, and that the plan was consummated, to bring in uninformed persons as original members,
shortly after the profit was taken; and that the corporate condonation
could have been little more than the echo of the promoters' voices.
The Court found the legal entity of the corporation an insuperable
obstacle to holding that there was no condonation. To so hold, it
was said, would necessitate giving " .
the corporation . . . a
new right from the fact that new men, who did not know what it
had done had . .
'Henderson

.

become members."' 10

The logical corollary of

v. Plymouth Oil Co., 141 Atl. 197 (Del. 1928) s.c. in the

lower courts, 131 Atl. 165 (1925),

(x926)

3 Wis. L. REV. 442, 136 AtI. 140

(1926); Roberson v. Draney, 53 Utah 263, 178 Pac. 35 (igig) ; Hamilton v.
Hamilton Mammouth Mines, io Ore. 546, 223 Pac. 926 (1924). The lone forerunner of these cases was Flagler Engraving Machine Co. v. Flagler, 19 Fed.
468 (C. C. Mass. 1884).

'Supra note 7. The case was decided without prejudice to the personal
rights of the members, 141 Atl. at 204.

'Supra note 4.
" 210

U. S. at 213, 28 Sup. Ct. at 636.
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this view, that, where there was one uninformed member when the
transaction took place, there has been no corporate condonation, has
been adopted, even though, in the case so holding, that one person
had sold his shares, and ceased to have any interest in the corporation
quite a long time before the facts were discovered. 1
On the other hand, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
called
upon, in Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bige12
low,

to adjudicate the very same transaction which was involved in

the Lewisohn case, found no condonation. 13 The court very ably
elaborated the doctrine, evolved by the House of Lords in Erlangerv.
New Sombrero Phosphate Co.," that the promoter is a fiduciary to
the corporation so long as he keeps it under his control, because
of the peculiar opportunity that such control gives him to overreach it.
For this reason its assent during that time ". . . can be of no greater
effect than the assent of a minor under guardianship to the breaches
of trust of his guardian."' 5 Hence, if it is contemplated to add new
original uninformed members, and if the promoter still controls the
corporation, the assent of all the then members, even though they
know all the facts, is of no effect.
Contrary as these two theories are, each of them has been criticised. Quite applicable to the federal view is the criticism that under
it a promoter's profit is or is not wrongful to the corporation according as the promoter adopts one scheme in preference to another to
bring in the originally contemplated uninformed members. 6 For
under this theory there may be a corporate recovery 1 7 if these persons
became members before the promoter's profit was taken,' 8 while there
Hughes v. Cadena De Cobre Mining Co., supra note 3. The court was
very explicit that the corporation's right to recover was not aided in the slightest
by the fact that a large number of persons were made originally contemplated
uninformed members shortly after the profit was taken, by the issuance of original shares to them. 13 Ariz. at 65, io8 Pac. at 236.
Supra note 4.
The very interesting history of the litigation arising out of the promotion
of the old Dominion Company appears in full in EHRIcH, op. cit. supra note I
§ 128; see also Little, op. cit. supra note i, at 87.
" Supra note 4.
2o3 Mass. at i89, 89 N. E. at 2o6, 40 L. R. A. (N. s.) at 333.
"EHiCH, op. cit. supra note I, at 266.
' Davis v. Las Ovas Co., supra note 4; Commonwealth
Steamship Co. v.
American Shipbuilding Co., 197 Fed. 797 (D. C. Ohio, 1912) (here the transferee, with notice, of the promoter's shares was held liable) ; Tilden v. Barber,
supra note 3 (a very interesting case) ; American Barley Co. v. McCourtie, 15o
Minn. 46o, 185 N. W. 506 (1921) ; Waynesville Hospital v. Sutphen, 175 N. C. 94,
94 S. E. 663 (1917); Nickel Plate Land Co. v. Broom, 96 W. Va. 586, 123 S. E.
954 (1924), Note (1924) 31 W. VA. L. REv. 67; Petrelli Co. v. Petrelli, 99 W.
Va. 72, 127 S. E. 915 (1925).
'This phrase, "the profit is taken," is used throughout as an abbreviation

for the more cumbersome one, "the contract is entered into by the corporation
with the promoter, the performance of which will result in the promoter actually
getting his profit."
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may not be when they become such after it was taken.10 Yet the substance of the various plans is the same, namely, to make the unwary
public put up the money, and the corporation has really no more
opportunity to assent under one plan than under another. 0 It is not
surprising that this view has elicited the rather bitter criticism that
rights against promoters are dependent upon form rather than upon
substance."
The Massachusetts theory, on the other hand, seems unimpugnable on its theory of corporate condonation, with one or two possible
exceptions.2 2 But it has not escaped allegations of unsoundness. Mr.
Weston has charged 23 that the court, really seeking to"give redress
to the members personally, disregards entirely whether those who are
members when the bill is brought, and who will benefit by the corporate recovery, are those who were wronged by the taking of the
profit; that it often permits recovery which benefits persons whom
the promoter has not at all wronged, perhaps the promoter himself
if he retains his shares, or perhaps his transferees, or perhaps trans' Old Dominion, etc., Co. v. Lewisohn, supra note 4; Ball v. Breed, Elliott
& Harrison, 294 Fed. 227 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), certioraridenied, 264 U. S. 584,
44 Sup. Ct. 333 (1924), Notes (1924) 24 COL. L. Rrv. 542, (1924) 8 MINN. L.
Rxv. 520; Ball v. Chapman, i F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 7th, i924); Mile Wide
Copper Co. v. Piper, 239 Par. 799, 43 A. L. R. 1359 (Ariz. 1925) ; Metcalfe v.
Mental Science Industrial Assn., i7 Wash. 50, 220 Pac. I (1923), (1924) 8
MINN. L. REv. 540; (i924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 324.
' It is in this connection that the Massachusetts theory is most commendable,
for it grants corporate relief quite irrespective of when the originally contemplated member became such. Old Dominion, etc., Co. v. Bigelow, supra note 4;
Datillo v. Roaten Creek Oil Co., 222 Ky. 378, 300 S. W. 854 (I927); Burneagle
Coal & Coke Co. v. Henritze, 139 Va. 422, 124 S. E. 224 (x924) ; Erlanger v.
New Sombrero Phosphate Co., supra note 4. Cf. Attorney General for Canada
v. The Standard Trust Co. of New York [1911] A. C. 498; Piggly Wiggly
Delaware v. Bartlett, 97 N. J. Eq. 469, I29 Atl. 413 (925) (where the corporation was not permitted to recover for promotion profits taken in no par value
stock). See Note (I926) 26 COL. L. REv. 447.
1 EiaicH, op. cit. supra note I, at 268; BALLANTIMNE, op. cit. supra note I,
at 189.
=Seemingly under this theory the corporation cannot recover when the promoters sell property to the corporation for more than it is worth, and after
taking all its shares in payment, immediately resell them to the uninformed public, in the consummation of a previously conceived plan. In re Ambrose Lake
Tin and Copper Mining Co., 14 Ch. Div. 39o (i88o). Contra: Jubilee Cotton
Mills v. Lewis [1924] A. C. 958.
So also it seemingly cannot recover where the promoters sell property to
the corporation for more than it is worth but retain all the original shares, and
do not bring in outside persons until later, when business exigencies require
additional shares to be issued. In re British Seamless Paper Box Co., supra
note 2. See Old Dominion, etc., Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. at 185-86, i9o, 89
N. E. at 205, 207, 40 L. R. A. (N. s.) at 331, 333-334. These views seem entirely
irreconcilable with a theory that promoter's profits are unrighteous unless the
corporation assents to them after it is free from his control.
2 Op. cit. supra note i. Prof. Ballantine and Mr. Ehrich also attack it vigorously.

Ibid.
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ferees from the original members.2" This apparently indiscriminate
mulcting of promoters has elicited the equally bitter criticism that,
under the Massachusetts theory, rights of promoters, as well as against
25
them, are dependent upon form and not upon substance.
A

SUGGESTED SOLUTION

The general impression received from the cases is that most
courts have assumed that profits taken by the promoter are harmful
and inequitable, with little inquiry whether promoter's profits do in
fact cause any loss either to the corporation or to the members. With
this assumption as a basis, they have imposed upon the promoter 28 the duties of a fiduciary. But, although practically all courts
appear to start with this premise, they reach results so conflicting,
27
and at times so difficult to reconcile with a fiduciary theory, that
one is driven to conclude that the premise is in need of revision.
An inquiry into the question whether promotion profits do cause a
loss, or are inequitable, either to the corporation or to its members,
seems, therefore, quite necessary as a basis for any solution of this
vexatious problem.
The Inequity of Promotion Profits
To the Corporation-The promoter's profit may be the result
of a sale of the property to the corporation at its actual value at that
time, he having obtained it at a lower figure, or may come from a
transfer at a greatly exaggerated valuation. When the transaction is
of the former class, it is not easy to perceive wherein the corporation
has suffered any loss at all. Nor does it appear that it loses in
every transaction of the latter type. For instance, where the promoter
receives his outrageous price in shares whose par value exceeds that
28of the property, it would seem that the entity has suffered no loss.
"This

is substantially the summary made by Prof. Ballantine of Mr.

Weston's criticisms. BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note I, at 184.
"Supra note 21.

"The word "promoter" is not a technical term and does not have a clearly
defined meaning. It has been suggested that there should be a distinction between those who are really acting in behalf of the proposed corporation, and
those who are acting merely for themselves; that the former should occupy a
relation analogous to that of an agent, and that the latter should be free to deal
at will with the corporation as long as they furnish it with an independent board
of directors. Isaacs, op. cit. supra note i, at goo. See also BALLANTIIN, op. cit.
supra note I, at 174; Ehrich, op. cit. supra note i, §§ 2, 3, 12.
'7Supra note 22.
"This is not a novel suggestion. See Little, op. cit. supra note x, at 96 et
seq. Upon this ground Prof. Little reconciles the English cases gathered in
footnote 22 supra, with the Erlanger case, supra note 4. However, in view of
Jubilee Cotton Mills v. Lewis, supra note 22, decided about fourteen years after
Prof. Little's article appeared, these English cases can no longer thus be reconciled.
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A share of stock is not a claim against a corporation, but is a part
0interest in it.
Therefore, the entity has received an asset and has
given up. in substance, nothing. Where the profit has not caused the
corporation any loss, there has apparently been no inequity to it and
seemingly it should not be allowed to recover.
On the other hand, when the corporation gives assets worth more
than the property it receives therefor, there can scarcely be any question but that it has suffered a loss. However, even if it has suffered a
loss, it does not necessarily follow that the promoter acted inequitably
toward it. Where the corporation was furnished with an independent
board of directors, who, without being deceived, agreed to the sale,3 ' it
would be quite reasonable to hold that it has not been improperly
treated. Inequity to it seems to be present only where profit is taken
in assets, and at a time when the corporation is entirely subject to the
control of the promoter; where it is, so to speak, coerced into agreeing.
Of course, in addition, if the promotion profit were derived from a
sale consummated by fraud upon independent directors, the promoter's
conduct would be inequitable to the corporation. However, such a
case presents no peculiar problem of promoter's liability, but is adequately cared for by the common law rules of fraud and deceit.
If the promoter has coerced the corporation, to its detriment, it
should have a right of recovery, and such right should not depend
upon its membership at any given time; that is, it should not be defeated by the fact that recovery may benefit persons who became
could not claim that the
members under such circumstances tha: 3they
2 promoter had wronged them personally.
To the Members 3 - here the promoter profited from a sale
to the corporation at the actual value of the property, it appears that
AB..ANTI.NE, op. cit. supra note i

§13o, and cases there cited.

v. Plymouth Oil Co., supra note 7. Contra: Yeiser v. U. S.
Board & Paper Co., supra note 3, at 348; semble, Ladywell Mining Co. v.
Brookes, 35 Ch.Div. 40o (1887).
' Lord Cairns, in Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3 App. Cas.
I218, at 1236 (3878) says that the promoter can discharge his fiduciary obligation
only by providing an independent board. But this has since been repudiated.
Lagunas Nitrate Co. v. Lagunas Syndicate [1899] z Ch. 392; Attorney
General for Canada v. The Standard Trust Co. of New York, supra note Mo.
With these cf. Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 168 App. Div. 483, 154
N. Y. Supp. 54 (IpS).
'This conclusion differs from the Massachusetts view only inthat itconsiders promoter's profits wrongful in fewer instances, and isquite inconsistent
with any premise that a promoter is a fiduciary. The Massachusetts view has
been criticised for letting the corporation recover indiscriminately, supra note 23,
but the suggested remedy limits its recovery to cases where it has been harmed.
LrrT.E, op. cit. supra note I,at 95.
=In considering the inequity of promotion profits to the members, the
problem will be approached from the point of view of whether the individual
members should have rights of recovery against the promoter, because of his acts
toward the corporation. Therefore the situation in which the promoter practices
fraud on the members themselves will not be considered, since it is covered by
'Henderson
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the interests in the corporation which the members personally own
through their relations to it as shareholders have not been damaged,
just as the corporation itself in such circumstances has not been, and
that they have not been treated inequitably by the promoter, and
should not have any personal rights against him. On the other hand,
when the sale was at an exaggerated valuation, it almost inevitably
follows that the personal interests of the members did suffer losses,
no matter whether the profit was taken in shares, in which case the
corporation apparently suffers no loss, or was taken in assets, in
which instance the corporation also seems to lose.
But that the members suffered losses hardly demonstrates, in
itself, that the promoter acted inequitably toward them. In this connection members may well be divided into two classes, those who
became such after the profit was taken, and those who became such
before that time.34 It may quite reasonably be argued, as is here done,
that such promotion profits are not at all unfair to the former class,
whether they were brought in as originally contemplated uninformed
members or otherwise, 5 and that they should have no personal rights
against the promoter, for they had an opportunity to exercise their
38
They
independent judgment as to whether they would take shares.
reasonably should acquire their interests in the corporation subject to
its then existent liabilities. But, by a parity of reasoning, they equally
should acquire, with their interests, the right to benefit from its
the common law action for deceit. It might be added that if the members have
been made whole by a corporate recovery, they should not be allowed individual suits, even where the promoter misrepresented the facts to them individually.
. At first blush, this distinction appears to subject the writer to the very
criticism he made of the Federal view. In fact, however, it does not, for the
criticism was there made because the rights of the corporation were made dependent upon when certain persons came in. This is very different from making
those persons' rights depend upon when they come in. The text of the note
endeavors to justify the distinction as it affects members' rights.
'In Brooker v. Thompson Trust Co., 254 Mo. 125, 162 S. W. 187 (1914), a

purchaser from a brokerage house which was the only innocent shareholder of
the corporation whose promoters profited at its expense, was denied recovery on
a representative bill, but solely because his transferor had had notice. The opinion of Woodson, P. J., who concurred only in result, is especially interesting.
Treating the bill as an attempt by the purchaser to recover in his own right, he
viciously assails the contention that a transferee from an original member should
have any personal right.
Upon similar considerations it would seem that subsequent creditors of the
corporation are not wronged by promoter's profits. Cf. Attorney General for
Canada v. The Standard Trust Co. of New York, supra note 20.
" See, for more detailed analysis of the proposition that investors should
anticipate that the promoter has profited before they became members. EHRicH,
loc. cit. supra note i (cited at length in Burneagle Coal & Coke Co. v. Henritze,
supra note 2o) ; Weston, op. cit. supra note I, at 44; Henderson v. Plymouth Oil
Co., supra note 7, at 2o9. But see Lord Macnaghten's caustic remarks about
such promoters in Gluckstein v. Barnes [igoo] A. C. 24o, at 248 (cited at length
in BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note I, at 17o).
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rights, one of which, where the profit came from taking assets worth
more than the property transferred therefor, is a corporate claim
against the pomoter. Hence, it may quite consistently be maintained
that, while such persons should have no personal rights, their presence
as members should not preclude a corporate recovery, even though
they personally, and not it, will probably benefit therefrom.3 7
Nor does it appear that a promoter acts inequitably to members
of the second class every time he takes a profit which causes them
losses. These may result from the poor judgment of an independent
board of directors, in which case the onus should lie upon the board,
not upon the promoter. Such members are inequitably treated by the
latter only, it would seem, where he, or his pawns, are the directors,
or where he defrauded an independent board.
The inequity to them personally, when any there is, is to their
interests in the corporation, and therefore, if it had a right of action,
they would not need personal suits so long as they remained members.
But had the corporation not been wronged, while they had been, personal remedies for them would be necessary, even thought they remained members. Ordinarily, however, many of those who were
members when the profit was taken have ceased to be such before any
corporate bill is instituted against the promoter.
But, their withdrawal should seemingly not destroy their personal
rights nor operate as a sale thereof to their transferees, for the reason
that such rights are personal, and not imbedded in their interests in
the corporation, although they arose therefrom. This right, it appears. should remain with them, as well when the corporation has
also been wronged as when it has not. It might seem that the promoter has a double liability where there are these transfers while he
must pay but once in their absence, and it might be objected that this
makes liability arise not from what the wrongdoer did, but from
what the injured parties do. Such contention, however, overlooks
that by the same act the promoter committed two wrongs, one to the
corporation, the other to the then members, and that, where there is
only one liability, it is not because there was only one wrong, but
because redress for one wrong necessarily redresses the other.
Of course, these transferors' rights to recover after transfer
should be dependent upon their ability to prove losses. If the transferees bought with knowledge that the corporation had a right against
the promoter, as where he took his profit in assets, they would probably pay their transferors, the withdrawing members, as part of the
purchase price, the estimated value of such anticipated recovery. This
should cut off the personal claims of the latter, not because they had
not been wronged by the taking of the profit, nor because they had
',Nor is this within Mr. Weston's criticism. His very real grievance was
that the Massachusetts view permitted a corporate recovery to benefit persons
whom the promoter bad not wronged, when he had not even wronged the corpcration. The present theory, by permitting such recoveries only when the corporation has been wronged, is consistent with Mr. Weston's attitude.
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sold their rights, but because they could show no loss from the wrongs.
Likewise, and for the same reason, the personal claims of the withdrawing members should be barred when the transfer occurred before the facts had been discovered.
Condonation
When the fiduciary doctrine is swept away, its artificial superstructure, "condonation," which was necessarily evolved under the
present law, to permit the promoter to keep those profits which good
conscience demanded be not taken away from him, becomes largely
superfluous, for profits "condoned" under the present law now become rightful in the taking.
The only place for such a concept under this solution seems
to be to provide for a release of the promoter where his profit actually was inequitable in its taking. The ordinary tests of the existence
of condonation used in other fields of the law become applicable.
However it might be pointed out that the corporation should not be
able to make a valid release until after the promotion scheme has
been completed, and it is free from the enervating control of the
promoter.38 In addition, it seems to the writer that, when it is free
of him, its release should be no less effectual when given informally
by all the members than when pompously executed by its directors. 9
But, of course, where the directors attempt to release the promoter's
liabilities, they should be required to stay within the usual powers of
directors to release corporate claims against wrongdoers.
Remedies
The rights of all parties to a promotion, especially those of the
corporation and of its members, are so complicated and interdependent
that a requirement that the rights of all be settled in one bill seems
desirable. 40 Such a requirement would avoid multiplicity of suits, and
would be most fair to the promoter in that all his liabilities would be
adjudicated at the same time. It would obviate the hardship necessarily visited upon the members, under a system requiring separate
bills, where they alone, and not the corporation, have been wronged.
The objection to such a suggestion is that it would greatly increase
the factual confusion and complexity, which at times appears a hopeless maze with only two, instead of three or more, conflicting and
contradictory accounts of the necessarily involved facts of the pro' This is exactly the Massachusetts theory of the time when the corporation
may validly condone.
3 While this may disregard the entity, it would nevertheless adequately protect the corporation. For upon the success of the corporation depends its members' profit, and it seems certain that if they permitted the promoters to keep
their profits, the corporation's interests would have been well protected.
I Compare with this, Prof. Ballantine's suggestion, that there should always
be a corporate right of action, BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note I, at 190.

NOTES

motion presented. But this very substantial difficulty arises entirely
from the intricacy of modem promotions, and would confront any
method of dealing with promoter's profits.
The only virtue claimed for these suggestions is that they attempt
to base the rights of all the parties involved in a corporate promotion
upon the substantive question of whether the promoter's profit, in
any particular case, really was inequitable to the particular party
seeking to recover. They find their justification in the present state
of the law, under which slich rights are dependent upon distinctions
which do not seem to be differences, and upon apparently inexplicable
exceptions. There is a crying need for revision when courts are
forced to resort to such undesirable and extremely unsatisfactory
juristic methods.

C.A.W.
POWER OF A COURT OF EQUITY TO APPOINT A RECEIVER TO WIND'
UP THE AFFAIRS OF A SOLVENT CORPORATION AT THE SUIT OF A
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER-When a corporation is being wrecked by

incompetent or unscrupulous officials, or when, because of internal
strife or failure of corporate purpose, it faces inevitable disaster,
has a court of equity the power to appoint a receiver to wind up its
affairs and distribute its assets? From a practical standpoint this is
a question of the rights of minority shareholders,' for the majority, in
a troublesome situation, have an ample remedy in their power to remove the officials or to have the corporation dissolved.2
The general jurisdiction of equity to appoint receivers for corporations, although much disputed in the past,3 is now well settled.4
However, the courts are by no means in accord on the question
whether equity can go so far as to appoint a receiver to wind up the
'Brent v. Brister Sawmill Co., 103 Miss. 876, 6o So. l18 (1912) ; Ponca
Mill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 98, 75 N. W. 46 (1898) ; Goodwin v. Cotzhausen,
171 Wis. 351, 177 N. W. 618 (1920).
2 While there has been some conflict as to whether, apart from statute, the
majority may dissolve the corporation against the wishes of the minority, the
better rule seems to be that, if they act in good faith, they may obtain a dissolution. 8 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1919) §§ 5452, 5461, and cases
cited therein; 3 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 629. A very interesting
discussion of this problem will be found in Warren, Voluntary Transfers of
Corporate Undertakings (1917) 3o HARV. L. REV. 335.
3I CLARK, REcEIvWRs (1918)
TIONS (1919) §§ 5214, 5215.

§§ 214, 215; 8 FLrCHER, PRIVATE CORPORA-

' Scattergood v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 247 Fed. 712 (E. D. Pa.
1917) ; Falfurrias Immigration Co. v. Spielhagen, 61 Tex. Civ. App. II1, 129
S. W. 164 (191o) ; Cameron v. Groveland Imp. Co., 20 Wash. i69, 54 Pac. 1128
(1898). The recent Pennsylvania case of McDougal v. Huntingdon & Broad
Top Mt. R. R. & Coal Co., 294 Pa. io8, 143 Atl. 574 (1928) clearly establishes
the jurisdiction of its courts in this respect.
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business and distribute the assets.

The appointment of a receiver is

purely remedial,' and ancillary to the principal relief sought.6 Thereequity
fore the problem resolves itself into the question whether
7
has jurisdiction to grant the substantive relief sought.
In the recent case of Hall v. City Park Brewing Co.," this question
was raised in Pennsylvania for the first time. The defendant corporation, though solvent, was unable, because of the Eighteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution and the Volstead Act, to carry out the purpose of its incorporation. The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, after
an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a liquidation within the corporation,
petitioned the court to appoint a receiver for the purpose of winding
up its affairs and distributing its assets. The directors and a majority
of the shareholders, inspired with the hope that the Volstead Act
would be so modified as to permit the brewing of a potable malt
liquor which it would be profitable to manufacture, desired to keep
the corporation in existence pending that time. The court held that
equity had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to wind up the affairs
of the corporation; that the facts of the case warranted such relief;
and that, if the officers of the corporation failed to liquidate the
company within a reasonable time, a receiver would be appointed
for the purpose.
In the earlier cases, and many of the recent ones, it has been
stated as a general rule that, apart from statutory authority, equity
has no power to distribute the assets of a corporation and wind up its
affairs on any ground.' As recently as 1919 Mr. Pomeroy asserted:
CC
* * it is well settled, with scarcely a dissenting voice, that
in the absence of statutory authority, a court of equity has no
power to dissolve a corporation, or to wind up its affairs and sequestrate its property." 'o
It is an equitable remedy and not an equitable right; a means and not an
end. Hull v. Caughy, 66 Md. 104, 6 Adt. 591 (1886) ; see Baltimore Bldg. & L.
Ass'n v. Alderson, 99 Fed. 489, 494 (C. C. A. 4th i9oo); I CLARE, REcEIVERs
(1918) §28.
6Vila v. Grand Island, etc., Co., 68 Neb. 222, 94 N. W. 136 (1903); see
Barber v. International Co. of Mexico, 73 Conn. 587, 593, 48 Adt. 758, 761
§§ 35, 36; HIGH, RECEIVERS (4th ed.
(1901); I CLARK, REcIVERs (1918)
191o) § 6.

In many states this jurisdiction has been expressly conferred by statutes,
the provisions of which are widely variant. It is not the purpose of the writer
to deal with this phase of the problem, but rather to confine the question to the

inherent jurisdiction vested in courts of equity, apart from statutory authority.
6294 Pa. 127, 143 Atl. 582 (1928).
o
'Pearce v. Sutherland, 164 Fed. 6o9 (C. C. A. 9th 19 8) ; Shearer v. Union
;
Vila v. Grand Island,
(1928)
E.
696
162
N.
373,
Ohio
App.
Mortgage Co., 28
etc., Co., supra note 6; Union Say. & Invest. Co. v. District Court, 44 Utah 397,
140 Pac. 221 (1914).
'04 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 1540.
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The theory underlying the cases adopting this view is that, as a corporation owes its corporate life to an act of the state, only the sovereign power of the state can dissolve it."1
It is submitted that these decisions have been based upon a misconception of the nature and effect of the relief sought, and a failure
to recognize the distinction between a dissolution in fact and a dissolution in contemplation of law.1 2 In any event, the question whether
the relief sought will result in a dissolution of the corporation seems
to be of relatively slight importance. The rule forbidding a court of
equity to dissolve a corporation had its origin at a time when corporations were created by special charters, which conferred valuable
and exclusive franchises upon their grantees. The reason for the
rule has entirely disappeared in respect to the ordinary business corporation, formed under general laws, the privileges conferred by
which are open to all who comply with certain statutory requirements.13 The intrinsic value of the corporate franchise, under modem
conditions, has become almost negligible.
In recent years there has been a growing tendency to recognize
exceptions to the general rule, and there is now a very respectable
array of judicial authority for the proposition that, where the rights
of a minority shareholder are being infringed upon, and there is no
other adequate remedy, a court of equity will grant relief, even to
the extent of winding up the affairs of the corporation and distributing
its assets.' 4
This change in judicial viewpoint is apparently due in part to
a growing realization of the inadequacy, under certain circumstances,
of other remedies,' 5 and to a more liberal exercise of the power of
See Denike v. New York & R. Lime & Cement Co., 8o N. Y. 599, 6o5
(i88o) and cases cited supra note 9. For an exhaustive list of cases in support
of this theory, see (91m) 39 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1o32.
"In 8 FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATxONS (1919) § 54o6, dissolution is defined as follows: "A corporation is said to be dissolved when the franchise to
be a corporation, conferred upon it by the state, is extinguished, and its corporate
existence terminated. A corporation may cease to exist for all practical purposes and yet not be dissolved as a matter of law. There is no dissolution,
strictly speaking, unless the corporation has lost all power to continue or to
resume its business as a going concern." I CLARx, RECEvERs (1918) § 223.
11 This thought was expressed in the recent case of Goodwin v. Cotzhausen,
supra note 1.
" Sellman v. German Union Fire Ins. Co., 184 Fed. 977 (C. C. Del. x9o9);
Noble v. Gadsden Land & Improvement Co., 133 Ala. 25o, 31 So. 856 (igoi);
Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N. W. 218 (x892) ; Brent v. Brister
Sawmill Co., supra note I; State v. Shelton, 238 Mo. 281, 142 S. W. 417 (01) ;
Benedict v. Columbus Construction Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 23, 23 Atl. 485 (i8gi) ;
Porter v. Industrial Information Co., 5 N. Y. Misc. 262, 25 N. Y. Supp. 328
(893) ; Klugh v. Coronaca Mill Co., 66 S. C. oo, 44 S. E. s66 (19o2).
See Gibbs v. Morgan, 9 Idaho 100, 114, 72 Pac. 733, 737 (19o3) ; Bowen v.
Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114 Kan. 95, 99, 217 Pac. 301, 303 (1923) ;
Brent v. Brister Sawmill Co., supra note I, at 89o, 6o So. at o2o; Goodwin v.
Cotzhausen, supra note 1, at 358, 177 N. W. at 621; 1 CLARK, REcEiVEns (I918)
§ 223. While a minority shareholder may, under certain circumstances, have a
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a court of equity to right whatever wrongs growing society may find
to exist, without the necessity of statutory authority to do so. In
1841, Lord Chancellor Cottenhan said,' in speaking of the power
to wind up the affairs of a joint stock company:
"I think it the duty of this Court to adapt its practice and
course of proceeding to the existing state of society, and not by
too strict an adherence to forms and rules, established under
different circumstances, to decline to administer justice, and to
enforce rights for which there is no other remedy."
It is a basic principle of corporate life that one who becomes a
shareholder impliedly agrees that he will be bound by the will of the
or
majority, in any matter which comes within the powers expressly
impliedly conferred upon the corporation by its charter.' 7 However,
it is equally well settled that there is a duty devolving upon the majority to exercise diligence and good faith in prosecuting the business
for which the corporation was created. If they fail in the performance of this duty, they have breached the corporate contract, and it
is well settled that a minority shareholder is entitled to relief.' 8
It is practically impossible to make a definite classification of all
the situations in which the relief has been granted, for whenever the
appointment of a receiver is sought, it is almost entirely within the
discretion of the court to decide whether the facts warrant the granting of the relief. As it was stated9 by a federal court, in McGeorge v.
Big Stone Gap Improvenwut Co.- :
"This discretion of the court should be a reasonable one,
governed to a great extent by the facts as they are presented in
each particular case, as no rule generally applicable has been or
can be established. Nor will this discretion be controlled by the
technical legal rights of the parties, but all the equities of the
entire case will be considered."
A situation in which the courts have very generally extended
relief is where there has been gross mismanagment and fraud on
the part of officers and directors, with the assent of the majority
shareholders, causing irreparable injury to the rights of a minority
particular act of the majority enjoined or avoided, such a remedy would obviously be inadequate where there was continuous fraud, or when the corporate
purpose had failed and the majority refused to wind up the affairs of the corporation.
" Wallworth v. Holt, 4 Myl. & C. 61g, 635 (Eng. 1841).
17 6 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPoRaTIONS (1918) § 3992, and cases cited therein;
6 THompsoN, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) 88 4490, 4493, 4506.
186 FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1918) §§ 3994, 3997, 3998; 6 Triiepsox, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 4494 et seq.
" 57 Fed. 262, 270 (W. D. Va. 1893).
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shareholder.2 Some courts have intervened on the ground that the
officers and directors are trustees for the shareholders, 2- but this
theory can be advanced only by way of analogy. There is, strictly
speaking, no trust relationship,2 2 and the attempts to apply the rule
have resulted in a great deal of confusion.2 3 The reason given by
the majority of the courts affording relief in this situation, that the
powers of equity have been enlarged for the purpose of more fully
protecting the rights of those owning minority interests,2 seems to be
much more sound.
Another situation in which this power has frequently been recognized is where there has been such dissension among shareholders,
officers, or directors that it was impossible to carry on the business
of the corporation. 25 This situation is analogous to that of the Hall
case, in that the corporation is no longer able to function.
The situation in the Hall case presents a strong case for the
intervention of a court of equity. The corporation has been prevented
' Brent v. Brister Sawmill Co., supra note I; Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co.,
Klugh v. Coronaca Mill Co., both supra note 14.
'Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., supra note 14; Cantwell v. Columbia Lead
Co., igg Mo. I, 97 S.W. 167 (i9o6); Exchange Bank of Wewoka v. Bailey, 29
Okla. 246, 116 Pac. 812 (1911); Union State Bank v. Mueller, 68 Okla. 152,
372 Pac. 05o (1918).
to the cor- Since the corporation holds both the legal and equitable titles
porate property and franchises, it is apparent that the officers are no more than
quasi trustees. 4 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1918) § 2261; 3 POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) §§ lO8g, lo9O.
' This confusion is amply evidenced by the varying interpretations which
have been placed upon the rule. See Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., supra note 14,
at II4, 53 N. W. at 223; Cantwell v. Columbia Lead Co., supra note 21, at 43,
97 S.W. at 179; I CLARK, RECEIVERS (I918) §233. Courts and writers differ
widely as to whether the cestui que trust is the corporation or the shareholders.
2 THo_,tPsoN, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) §§ 1322, 1323; 4 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS

(1918) §2270.

However, it has been stated by an eminent

authority that the corporation is the sole cestui que trust with regard to the corporate property and franchises, and that the shareholders are cestuis que trust
sezt
only with respect to their shares of stock. 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
(4th ed. 1919) §§ 1O9O, 1091.

"In Brent v. Brister Sawmill Co., supra note I, at 89o, 6o So. at IO2O, the
court said, speaking of the old rule denying this jurisdiction in a court of equity:
"We find that in the progress of time and in the development of the jurisprudence of our land this rule has been somewhat changed, and the power of a court
of equity has been enlarged for the purpose of more fully protecting the interests
of all those owning interests in corporations . . . It has been necessary to
change materially the general rules originally applied by the courts in construing the obligations and duties of those engaged in business through corporations
. . . Now, if . . . the majority refuses to wind up the affairs of the com-

pany, then should not the rights of the minority stockholders be protected by the
law? And, if so, is not equity the proper court to extend such protection?" See
Goodwin v. Cotzhausen, supra note I, at 358, 177 N. W. at 621; Thwing v.
McDonald, 134 Minn. 148, 152, 158 N. W. 820, 822 (1916) ; Dill v. Johnston, 72
Okla. 149, 151, 179 Pac. 6o8, 609 (1919).

'Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., supra note 15; Green v.
National Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N. V. io56 (1917); Graham v.
McAdoo, 135 Ky. 677, 123 S. W. 260 (19o9).
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by law from doing the thing for which it was incorporated, and there
is no longer any reason why it should remain in existence.2 6 Such a
course must result in irreparable injury to the interests of the helpless
minority shareholder.
The court recognizes that there is a statutory method of dissolving a corporation, 7 but holds that this does not prevent a court of

equity from correcting manifest abuses, unlawful practices, or unfair
acts of corporate officers and majority shareholders, even though the
relief granted may result in a virtual winding up of the corporate
business. When the purposes for which a corporation was created
fail, there is a duty imposed upon its officials to wind up its affairs;
and if they fail to do so, a court of equity should have the power
to step in and prevent28 the majority from deliberately withholding
a division of the assets.

The decision in the Hall case is a sound one, and represents a
progressive tendency which is to be commended. It is supported
by many cases in other jurisdictions; it is perfectly consonant with
the basic principles of equity jurisdiction; and, from a practical standpoint, its wisdom can hardly be disputed.

W. F. C., Jr.
THE DOCTRINE OF JOINT ENTERPRISE AND ITS RELATION TO
IMPUTED NEGLIGENcE-The Court of Errors and Appeals of New

Jersey held, in the recent case of Harberv. Graham,' that the doctrine
of joint enterprise had no application in an action by a passenger
against the negligent driver of an automobile. This decision, having
been handed down by a court divided eight to seven, indicates so
high a degree of judicial uncertainty on the subject as to warrant an
examination of the doctrine.
The rule of "imputed negligence," namely, that a passenger in
any vehicle is so identified with the driver that the negligence of
the driver will absolutely bar a recovery by the passenger for the
concurring negligence of a third party, had its origin in the classic
English case of Thorogood v. Bryan.' The doctrine was grounded on
-' The power of a court of equity to wind up the affairs of a corporation and
distribute its assets, on the ground of failure of corporate purpose, has often
been upheld. Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Quinby, 137 Fed. 882 (C. C. A. 7th
1905) ; Decatur Land Co. v. Robinson, 184 Ala. 322, 63 So. 522 (1913) ; O'Connor v. Knoxville Hotel Co., 93 Tenn. 708, 28 S. W. 3o8 (1894).
By the act of the majority through the court. Act of I856, P. L. 293,
PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §§ 5791-5804.

I MORAWETZ, PRIVArE CORPORATrONS (2d ed. 1886) § 282; see Benedict v.
Columbus Constr. Co., supra note 14, at 36, 23 At. at 490; Brent v. Brister Sawmill Co., supra note I, at 89o, 6o So. at io2i.
1143 Atl. 340 (N. J. 1928).
28 C. B. 115 (Eng. 1849). The facts of this case would seem to indicate
that the passenger was guilty of contributory negligence and that the language
of the court was, unfortunately, much broader than necessary.

NOTES
the fiction that the driver was the servant or agent of the passenger,
and that the passenger was therefore responsible for the negligence
of the driver. While Thorogood v. Bryan was followed for a time
in England 3 and to a limited degree in this country,4 the doctrine
did not receive general sanction, and it is now repudiated both here 5
and in England, where the classic case and those following it were
finally overruled. 6
The decline of the imputed negligence theory, however, was accompanied by the growth of the doctrine of joint enterprise, which
seems to have originated as an exception to the denial of the broad
theory of imputed negligence. While practically all courts 7 now
admit that the existence of a joint enterprise will materially affect
the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto, their statements in
the matter are vague and vacillating. It is the purpose of this note
to ascertain what relationship must exist between the driver and the
passenger of a private vehicle to constitute a joint enterprise, and the
legal effects of this relationship.
At the outset it is essential to determine on what, if any, sound
legal principles this doctrine can be supported. Some authorities
have stated that "there does not seem to be any sound reason" 8 for
the theory. Others have attempted to support it on the ground of a
master and servant relationship.9 This, however, seems to be funda3

Armstrong v. Lancashire Ry., L. R. io Ex. 47 (Eng. 1875).
'Slater v. Burlington Ry., 71 Iowa 209, 32 N. W. 264 (1887); Phila. &
Reading R. R. v. Boyer, 97 Pa. 9I (i881), overruled in Dean v. Penna. R. R.,
129 Pa. 514, 18 At. 718 (1889); Lauson v. Fond du Lac, 143 Wis. 57, I23
N. W. 629 (iO9), overruled in Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493, 181 N. W. 739
(1921).
'Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366, 6 Sup. Ct. 391 (1886) ; McBride v. Des
Moines City Ry., 134 Iowa 398, 1O9 N. W. 618 (196) ; Bennett v. New Jersey
Ry.& Trans. Co., 36 N. J. L. 225 (1873). See Corrigan, Imputed Negligence
as Applied against a Guest in a Private Conveyance (1919) 3 MARQ. L. REv.
169; Note (1907) 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 598.
The Bernina, 12 P. D. 58 (Eng. 1887).
Kansas City, M & 0. Ry. v. Durrett, 187 S. W. 427 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916) is the only case that has been found which repudiates the joint enterprise
theory.
8
Note (19o7) 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 628; see Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. v.
Durrett, supra note 7.
'In delivering the opinion of Harber v. Graham, supra note i, at 342, White,
J., said: ". . . this principle [joint enterprise] resting as it does upon the
relation of agency existing inter sese among persons engaged in a joint or common enterprise, is applicable only as regards third persons not parties in such
enterprise. For instance, if two persons engaged in a common enterprise are,
as a part of that enterprise, riding in an automobile driven by one of them, who
is subject to the direction of the other, and the other one is injured . . . the
injured joint enterprise party cannot recover against the driver of the other car,
because of the contributing negligence of his agent, viz., of the party engaged
with him in the joint enterprise and under his control." (Italics are the
writer's.) Accord: Bryant v. Pac. Electric Ry., 174 Cal. 737, 164 Pac. 385
(1917); Parker v. Ullom, 271 Pac. 187 (Colo. 1928); Coleman v. Bent, Ioo
Conn. 527, 124 At. 224 (1924); Non v. Chicago City Ry., 232 II1. 378, 83
N. E. 924 (1go8) ; see Kelly v. Hodge, 197 Cal. 598, 242 Pac. 76 (1925).
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mentally nothing more than a recanting of the fictional basis of
Thorogood v. Bryan. It is essential to the validity of this theory
that the passenger have the right to control the manner of driving the
car at the time of the accident. 10 There is no doubt, of course, that
a master may be responsible for the negligence of his servants, and
no one can question that, where such a relationship does exist between
the passenger and the driver, and the passenger does have the right
of control over the driver, the passenger is justly chargeable with the
negligence of the driver. However, numerous cases can be found in
which the court invoked the doctrine of joint enterprise where the
driver owned the car," or in which it was owned jointly by the driver
and the passenger, 12 or in which neither owned it but they had borrowed it on their joint responsibility. 3 It will.be seen that in all of these
cases the passenger has, at most, a very limited right of sharing control with the driver, and that, therefore, a pure master-servant theory
would not allow of imputing the negligence of the driver to the
passenger.
Another concept which has been advanced to sustain the joint
enterprise doctrine is a vague quasi-partnership theory. Here, as in
a discussion of the master-servant theory, the obvious observation
can be made that, when a partnership actually exists, with the operation of the car as part of the partnership business, the passenger will
be responsible for the negligence of the driver. In the average case,
however, no such clear cut relationship exists between the parties,
"0It must be remembered in this connection that right of control and not
actual control at the moment of the accident is the determining factor. See
Cresent Motor Co. v. Stone, 21 Ala. 56, 517, 10
shaw v. Payne, ii Kan. 475, 207 Pac. 8o2 (1922).

So. 49, 51 (1924) ; cf. Brad-

' Hanser v. Youngs, 212 Mich. 508, i8o N. W. 409 (1920) ; Judge v. Wallen,
98 Neb. i54, 152 N. W. 318 (1915); Langley v. Southern Ry., 113 S. C. 45,
ioi S. E. 286 (i919); Van Horn v. Simpson, 35 S. D. 640, 153 N. W, 883
(915); Derrick v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry., 5o Utah 573, 168 Pac 335 (917):
Jensen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 183 Wash. 208, 233 Pac. 635 (1925).
' Tannehill v. Kansas City, C. & S. Ry., 279 Mo. 158, 213 S. W. 818 (199);
Lucey v. John Hope & Sons, 45 R. I. 1O3, 12o Atl. 62 (1923).
3 Hurley v. City of Spokane, 125 Wash. 263, 217 Pac. 2oo4 (1923)
(brother
and sister in a family car). But cf. Turney v. United Ry., i55 Mo. App. 513,
135 S. W. 93 (1911).

Courts at times confuse a joint enterprise situation with

a pure master-servant situation. In two cases, Boyd v. Close, 82 Colo.
Pac. lO79 (1927) ; Howard v. Zimmerman,

12o

150,

257

Kan. 77, 242 Pac. 131 (1926)

the facts were substantially these: A, a minor, borrowed his family's car, and,
through the negligence of B, a friend and also a minor, whom A had allowed to
drive, injured P. In a third case, Materson v. Leonard, 116 Wash. 551, 200
Pac. 320 (1921), the negligence of B, while carrying A on the handlebars of
A's father's bicycle, concurred with the negligence of D, to injure A. In all
three cases the courts purported to find a joint enterprise, and thus in the first
two held A liable for the injury to P, and in the third did not allow A to recover
from D. Query: would the courts have found the existence of a joint enterprise had A been controlling the vehicle?

NOTES

and analogy and indefinite language become the order of the day. 1
The basis of this theory is the fact that each has authority to act for
both and that a joint right of control exists between the parties, which
right so identifies them that the negligence of one may be imputed
to the other. 5
At once a difficulty will appear to stand in the way of an analogy
between a joint enterprise and a technical partnership, namely, the
finding of a contract, so essential to the institution of a partnership.'
There is of course, in the average case, no express contract, and it is
therefore usually necessary to find an implied contract in the actions
and remarks of the parties prior to the joint undertaking. The
necessity of finding this contract is not definitely pointed out by the
courts, but it is believed that, in practically all cases in which a joint
enterprise has been upheld, an implied contract of suffiient strength
to support the analogy may be found in the agreement necessary to
create the joint control or grant the mutual authority. Other and more
serious difficulties, however, prevent a perfect analogy. A partnership must be organized with a view to business profits, 7 whereas joint
enterprises have been upheld when no element of business was involved.' 8 Furthermore, a partnership usually involves the joint ownership of the property used to advance the partnership interests, while
in the average joint enterprise case the car belongs to one or the
other of the joint enterprisers.
While, therefore, the analogy clearly is not perfect, it is submitted that it is sufficiently close to form a basis for the theory, and
that the existence of a joint right of control is a sufficient ground
upon which to predicate a joint responsibility. It will be seen at once
that those cases which were incomprehensible under the masterservant theory, because the passenger could by no stretch of the
" "It is a sort of a partnership, as it were." BERRY, AuTOmronLS (5th ed.

1927) § 591.

"The rule is founded on the theory of partnership or a relation
akin to partnership." Kokesh v. Price, 136 Minn. 3o4, 3o9, i6I N. V. 715, 717
(917).

'Robinson v. Oreg. Wash. Ry. & Nay. Co., go Oreg. 490, 509, 176 Pac. 594,
6oo (igi8) : "If then, it shall appear . . . that the terms of this so called
partnership provide that each party to it may control the vehicle or control its
movements, either constantly or alternately, the negligence of the one will be
imputable to the other, so far as it grows out of faulty management or operation
of the machine of transportation. But if such control is outside the scope of
the partnership, or is vested exclusively in one of the members, imputed negligence in operation will not arise." Accord: Meyers v. So. Pac. Ry., 63 Cal.
App. 164, 218 Pac. 284 (1923) ; Clark v. Mo. Pac. Ry., ii5 Kan. 823, 224 Pac.
920 (1924); Cunningham v. Thief River Falls, 84 Minn. 21, 86 N. W. 763
(i9oi) ; Treadway v. United Ry. of St. Louis, 300 Mo. i56, 253 S. W. 1037
(923) ; Cresent Motor Co. v. Stone, supra note io; see (1920) 5 IOWA L. BULL.
121; Koplitz v. Saint Paul, infra note 26 at 375, 9o N. W. at 795, in which it is
said that each must have "authority, express or implied, to act for all."
"Bunixcx, PARTNERSHIP (3d ed. 1917) 5 et seq.
"Ibid p. 33; GILmORE, PARTNERSHIP (igii) 3, 44-46.
"Hurley v. City of Spokane, supra note 13; Howard v. Zimmerman, supra
note 13. See infra page 68o and note 2o.
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imagination be said to have a complete right of control over the driver,
are explainable on a theory grounded on a johit right of control. The
majority of the decided cases would seem to support the view that
this "almost partnership" theory is the one upon which the joint
enterprise doctrine may best be rested. 19
If this be the theory underlying the joint enterprise doctrine,
in what situations will the courts draw the analogy? While the
infancy of the doctrine makes it impossible to state definitely the
boundaries that will ultimately be drawn about it, certain tendencies
may be pointed out. If the purpose of the joint undertaking is solely
20
pleasure, the courts seem rather loath to uphold a joint enterprise,
preferring to call the relationship one of host and guest, unless there
is an agreement that the parties will share in the defraying of the expenses. " ' When the parties have combined for business reasons, the
courts appear more apt to find the existence of a joint enterprise. 2 2
A possible justification of this distinction lies in the fact that, since a
partnership must be organized for business profits, a much closer
analogy can be drawn between the joint business venture and the
strict partnership, than between the pleasure undertaking and the
partnership. The fellow-servant relationship does not create a joint
enterprise,'2 3 nor does the fact of close blood or family relationship
furnish, per se, the requisite community of interest.' 4 Since no two
cases are identical on their facts and since the question is one partly
for the court and partly for the jury, -" it will be seen that it is im'Bradshaw

v. Payne, supra note IO; Lucey v. John Hope & Sons, supra

note i2; and cases cited supra notes ii and I5; see (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 565.
" Pope v. Halpern, 193 Cal. 168, 223 Pac. 470 (1924) (verdict for passenger
against a third party rev'd on other grounds) ; Lawrence v. Sioux City, 172 Iowa
320, 154 N. W. 494 (1915) (the court said that the joint enterprise of riding is
not sufficient) ; Nicora v. Cerveri, 49 Nev. 261, 244 Pac. 897 (1926) ; Ronan v.
Turnbull, 99 Vt. 280, 131 At. 788 (1926) ; Landry v. Hubert, ioo Vt. 268, 137
Atl. 97 (1927); Parker v. Ullom, supra note 9. Contra: Hurley v. City of
Spokane, supra note 13; Howard v. Zimmerman, supra note 13; cf. Washington
See Note
& 0. D. Ry. v. Zell's Adm'x, 118 Va. 755, 88 S. E. 309 (i916).
(2927) 12 VA. L. Rav 341, 343, n. 7.
'Jensen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., supra note II.
- Hanser v. Youngs; Judge v. Wallen; Van Horn v. Simpson; Derrick v.
Salt Lake Ry., all supra note ii; Tannehill v. Kansas City, C. & S. Ry., supra
note 12.
'Denver Tramway Co. v. Orback, 64 Colo. 511, 172 Pac. 2O63 (1918)
(policeman and city chauffeur answering riot call) ; Grand Rapids v. Cooker, 219
Mich. 278, 189 N. W. 221 (1922) ; McBride v. Des Moines Ry., supra note 5
(both firemen cases) ; Seiver v. Pittsburg Ry., 252 Pa. I, 97 Atl. 116 (1916)
(motorman and conductor of trolley).
2' Bryant v. Pacific Electric Ry., supra note 9 (father and son) ; Bowley v.
Duca, 8o N. H. 548, 12o Atl. 74 (1923) (husband and wife) ; Turney v. United
Ry., supra note 13 (cousins).

But cf. Hurley v. City of Spokane, supra note

23

(brother and sister going to church in family car held on joint venture).
"See Robinson v. Oreg. Wash. Rv. & Nay. Co., supra note 15, at 510, 176
Pac. at 6oo, where the court said: "The dilemma presents a mixed question of
law and fact, which must be left to the jury in all cases where there is a dispute

NOTES

possible, except for the above generalizations, to state which factual
26
situations will and which will not constitute a joint enterprise.
Admitting the existence in any given case of a joint enterprise,
the question next arises as to its legal effect.2 7 Most of the decided
cases have been actions by the passenger against the negligent driver
of another vehicle. In these cases the question of joint enterprise has
been raised by the defendant, in an attempt to impute the negligence of
the plaintiff's driver to the plaintiff and thus to prevent his recovery
on the grounds of contributory negligence. Whether the joint enterprise
has been found to exist on the limited master-servant theory or on the
"almost partnership" theory, its existence is, of course, a complete
bar to a recovery by the passenger. A master is so far identified with
his servant that the negligence of the servant within the scope of
his employment, concurring with the negligence of a third party to
cause the injury, will prevent a recovery from the third party by the
master.2 8 Likewise there can be no question but that the negligence
of one partner in a similar case2 9 would prevent a recovery by the
other partner from a third party.
It is equally clear that on either theory the negligence of the
driver is so far imputed to the passenger that an innocent third party,
injured by the negligence of the driver, would be able to recover
from either the driver or the passenger. A master is liable for the
negligence of his servant in the scope of his employment, 30 as is a
in the testimony, or where reasonable men would fairly draw different conclusions. . . ." See also Ward v. Meeds, 114 Minn. 18, 13o N. W. 2 (1911);
Judge v. Wallen, supra note II.

' The clearest yardstick found by the writer is the statement of Start, C. J.,
in Koplitz v. St. Paul, 86 Minn. 373, 375, 9o N. W. 794, 795 (1902) : "If

*

two or more persons unite in the joint prosecution of a common purpose, under
such circumstances that each has authority, express or implied, to act for all in
respect to the control of the means or agencies employed to execute such common purpose, the negligence of one in the management thereof will be imputed to
all the others."
I This situation must not be confused with a voluntary assumption of risk.
In the first place, one can hardly be said to voluntarily assume the risk of being
injured by the future negligence of another. In the second place, a voluntary
assumption of risk, even if it could be found to exist, would act only to prevent
a recovery by the passenger, whereas the legal effect of a joint enterprise, as
will be seen immediately, is much broader.
It will be seen also that this problem is quite distinct from the question of
contributory negligence. The responsibility of the passenger upon the joint
enterprise theory is not at all dependent upon his own fault or negligence.
Moreover while contributory negligence merely would prevent a recovery by the
passenger, the existence of a joint enterprise may render him liable to third
parties.
' Little v. Hackett, supra note 5; see Moon v. St. Louis Transit Co., 237
Mo. 425, 436, 141 S. W. 870, 872 (91i).
I This is an odd situation to which no reference has been found, but it is
obvious that, just as a partner is held liable for the negligence of his copartner
(see BuaDicx, loc. cit. iifra note 3), so the negligence of the one would prevent
a recovery by the other from a third party.
10Hough v. Heller, 92 N. J.L. 552, xo7 Atl. 44 (1919) ; MECHEm,AGENCY
(2d ed. 19i4) §§ 1874-1877.
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partner for the negligence of other members of the firm when acting
in pursuance of the partnership business.3 1 Although this type of case
is rarer than the class first mentioned, the decisions uniformly hold.
as has been
worked out, that the passenger is liable to innocent third
32
parties.
The only type of case remaining unexamined is that in which
the passenger sues the driver, and the driver attempts to interpose
the doctrine of joint enterprise as a defense, by imputing the driver's
negligence to the passenger. The attempted defense should, of course,
fail on either theory, for it is well settled that a servant owes a duty
of care to his master, 3 and almost equally well settled that a member
of a partnership is liable to other members of the firm for his negligence and misconduct. 34 Thus, in accord with principle, it is the
consensus of the decided cases that in an action by the passenger
against the driver, the driver may not interpose the doctrine of joint
enterprise as a defense. The strongest judicial expression against
this view is the opinion of the seven dissenting judges in Harber v.
Graham,35 but the fact that none of them considered their opinion
of sufficient moment to file a dissenting opinion detracts considerably
from the weight which may be accorded to their view.
C.R.W.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR THE CONVERSION OF SHARES OF
CORPORATE STOCK IN PENNSYLVANIA-In

the recent case of Gervis

v. Day," a stock-broker, who held shares of stock on margin for a
customer, misunderstood the directions of the customer and sold at
a price at which he was not authorized. The customer sued to recover damages for the conversion. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held the measure of damages to be the highest market price
attained by the shares between the time of their conversion and a reasonable time after the customer had notice of the sale.
The problem of the measure of damages for the conversion of
shares of corporate stock has been the subject of much controversy.
Ordinarily the measure of damages for the conversion of chattels is
the value of the chattels at the t'me of the wrongful act.2 But the
English courts early recognized that this general rule would not be

(3d ed. 1917) 209.
"Van Horn v. Simpson, supra note II ; Boyd v. Close, Howard v. Zimmerman, both supra note 13; Adams v. Swift, 172 Mass. 521, 52 N. E. io68 (1899);
see Judge v. Wallen, supra note II.
3 BURDICK, PARTNERSHIPS

" MEcHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1275.

' Newly v. Hamell, 99 N. C. 149, 5 S. E. 284 (1888) ; see Marsh's Appeal,
69 Pa. 3o, 34 (1871) ; STORY, PARTNERSHIPS (Whart. 7th ed. 1881 § 169).
ISupra note I. See (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 696, for a discussion of
statutes limiting this liability.
'Pa. Sup. Ct., decided November 26, 1928.
2i SEDGwicK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) 452.
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applicable to shares of fluctuating value, and adopted as the measure
of damages the market value at the date of the trial when the shares
had risen in value,3 and the value at the time of conversion when
the shares had declined in value.4 This is still the rule in England.,
In this country some jurisdictions still adhere to the general
rule of the market value at the time of the conversion. To avoid the
harshness of this rule when applied to shares of fluctuating value,
the early New York courts measured the damages by the highest
intermediate value between the conversion and the verdict, if the action was prosecuted with due diligence.7 While this rule has been
adopted by statute in other states,8 it has been criticized because it
attributes to the plaintiff a superhuman sagacity in assuming that
he would have sold at the very highest price had there been no conversion,0 and because it enables the plaintiff to profit by delays in
court proceedings. To redress such fictitious losses, is to make the
estimation of damages conjectural and uncertain. 10 In order to correct these weaknesses in the highest intermediate value rule, the New
York Court of Appeals in Baker v'. Drake 1 held the proper measure
'Shepherd v. Johnson, 2 East. 211 (Eng. i8o2) ; Owen v. Routh, 14 C. B.
327 (Eng. 1854). While these cases involve breach of contract to return shares
on a given day, the rule is applicable to tort actions because the rule of damages
does not depend on the form of the action. Infra note 34. In an action for
breach of contract to sell shares the plaintiff still has his money with which to
purchase similar stock, and the measure of damages is the difference between
the contract price and the value of the shares at the time the contract is breached.
Shaw v. Holland, i5 M. & W. 136 (Eng. 1846); Jamal v. Dawood [igi6] i
A. C. 175.

'Sanders v. Kentish, 8 T. R. 162 (Eng. 1799) ; cf. Forrest v. Elwes, 4 Ves.
(Eng. 1799).
'Murray v. Hewitt, 2 T. L. R. 872 (Eng. 1886). The rule of the highest
intermediate value between the act of conversion or breach of contract and the
verdict, has not been followed in England. Simons v. London Joint Stock Bank
[I8gi] i Ch. 270; Shaw v. Holland [i9oo] i Ch. 305; MAYNE, DAMAGES (ioth
ed. 1927) 177; 4 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. i916) 4242. Cf. Harrison v.
Harrison, i C. & P. 412 (Eng. 1824) ; Vaughan v. Wood, I Myl. & K. 403 (Eng.
1833) ; Michael v. Hart [i9o2] I K. B. 482.
'Hamburg Bank v. George, 92 Ark. 472, 123 S. W. 654 (i9O9); Layman v.
492

Slocomb & Co., 7 Penn. 403, 76 Atl. io94 (Del. i9o9) ; Bank of Baltimore v.

Harris, 77 Md. 423, 26 Atl. 520 (1893) ; Boylan v. Huguet, 8 Nev. 345 (1873).
'Romaine v. Van Allen, 26 N. Y. 309 (1863); Markham v. Jaudon, 41
N. Y. 235 (1869). These decisions purport to find in the English cases authority
for the highest intermediate rule, but later New York cases recognize that there
is no such precedent. Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, 221 (1873).
82 SEDGWICK, op. cit. supra note 2, at ioi6, 1017, and cases there cited.
I See Baker v. Drake, supra note 7, at 215; Doyle v. Burns, 123 Iowa 488,
508, 99 N. W. 195, 202 (1904) ; 4 SUTHELAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 4242.
"0See Matthews v. Coe, 49 N. Y. 57, 62 (1872). The rule was impractical
from the point of view of the brokerage business, as shown in 2 Dos PAssos,
STOCK-BROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES (2d ed. 19o5) 922.
'53 N. Y. 211 (1873) aff'd 66 N. Y. 518 (1876). Accord: Mayer v.
Monzo, 221 N. Y. 442, 117 N. E. 948 (1917). The plaintiff is not entitled to an
increase in price between the conversion and his notice of it. Burnham v. Lawson, I8 App. Div. 389, 103 N. Y. Supp. 482 (I9o7).
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of damages in margin transactions to be the highest market price of
the shares from the time of the conversion up to a reasonable time to
replace it after the customer had notice of the sale. This rule was
soon extended to transactions in which the customer had paid in
full for the shares, which were held for investment rather than for
speculation.1" It has also been followed by the United States Supreme
Court 11 and the courts of many other states. 4 The question of what
length of time is reasonable depends on the facts in each situation.""
When the shares decline in value after the conversion, the plaintiff
is entitled to the value at the time of conversion."3
In Pennsylvania this question of the measure of damages when
shares of stock have been converted has had an interesting development. Just as the New York courts experimented in attempts to find
a satisfactory rule of damages for this type of fluctuating property, so
have the Pennsylvania decisions limited and distinguished earlier
cases while groping for a rule that would be adequate under all circumstances. The evolution of the Pennsylvania law on this point reveals efforts to depart from the general rule that the measure of
damages is the value at the time of conversion, coupled with a tendency
to adhere to that rule until a satisfactory substitute has been found.
It would seem that such satisfactory alternative has been found in
Gervis v. Day.
The general problem arises in three situations: where a trustee
Wright v. Bank of Metropolis, no N. Y. 237, I8 N. E. 79 (i888) ; Matter

of Dickinson, 171 App. Div. 486, 157 N. Y. Supp. 251 (1916).

Some writers see

no reason for extending the rule of Baker v. Drake to shares fully paid for by
the customer, inasmuch as the court in that case limited its decision to the con-

version of shares held on margin. 2 Dos PAssos, op. cit. supra note 1o, at 932.
However, it is difficult to see any basis for such a distinction. I SEDGWICK, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 456.
" Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, 9 Sup. Ct. 335 (1888), where a broker

converted shares deposited on margin. The rule has been applied to an action
for breach of a broker's contract of pledge. In re Swift, 114 Fed. 947 (D. C.
Mass. 1902). It is also applicable to suits for breach of trust. McKinley v.
Williams, 74 Fed. 94 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896) ; Wilson v. Colorado Mining Co., 227
Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).

" Hughes v Barrell, 167 Ill. App. ioo (1912); Weaver v. Commercial Sav; Dimock v. U. S. Nat. Bank,
55 N. J. L. 296, 25 Atl 926 (893) (action of tort for conversion). Wiggin v.
Federal Stock and Grain Co., 77 Conn. 507, 59 Atl. 6o7 (ipo5); Miller v.
ings Bank, 222 Mich. 337, 192 N. W. 578 (923)
Lyons, 113 Va. 275, 74 S. E. 194

(1912)

(assumpsit for breach of contract of

pledge). In Iowa the rule of Baker v. Drake is limited to margin transactions.
Doyle v. Burns, supra note 9.
" In Miller v. Lyons, supra note 14, twenty-one days was held a reasonable
time. In Colt v. Owens, 9o N. Y. 368 (1882), thirty days was a reasonable
time. In Peschke v. Wright, 93 Misc. 154, i56 N. Y. Supp. 773 (i9i6), three
months was an unreasonable time. The concept of a duty to replace on the part
of the plaintiff is used only as a means of computation in order to determine the
limits within which he must prevent avoidable consequences. I SEDwIVIcK, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 452.

"Taussig v. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425 (1874); McIntyre v. Whitney, 139 App.
Div. 557, 124 N. Y. Supp. 234 (igio) aff'd 201 N. Y. 526, 94 N. E. 'o96 (1911).
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has breached his trust, where a pledgee or bailee has converted shares
or has breached his contract of pledge, and where a borrower or
vendor refuses to deliver. The issue was first raised in Bank of Montgoinery v. Reese 17 where the defendant bank refused to allow the
plaintiff shareholders to subscribe for additional shares. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that where the consideration
had been paid, the measure of damages was the highest market value
between the breach and the trial. The decision purported to be based
on English precedents,:' and on an analogy to the equity practice of
forcing a trustee to replace converted shares even though he would
have to purchase them in the open market at an increased price.' 9
This rule was soon limited to a relationship of trustee and cestui que
trust,20 but the courts were liberal in their definition of a trustee

relationship. 2' A further limitation of the rule held that it did not
2
apply unless there was a duty to deliver shares at a definite time. 1
In the absence of such definite delivery day the measure of damages
for conversion or for breach of contract to return, was the general
rule of the market value at the time of the conversion 23 or of the
The facts show that the defendant retained possession
"726 Pa. 143 (856).
of the shares until trial, but do not reveal the availability of such shares on the
open market, and therefore it cannot be determined whether the plaintiff might
have mitigated his losses by replacing. The court treated the defendant as a
trustee.
" According to most authorities the rule of highest intermediate value has no
application in England. Supra note 5.
'Generally, equity will not decree specific performance of a contract for
the sale or delivery of shares of stock unless the shares have no market value
or the situation is such that there is no adequate remedy at law. North Central
Rwy. v. Walworth, 193 Pa. 207, 44 Atl. iio2 (1899); STORY, EQurry Ju tsPRUDENcE (i4th ed. 1918) 375.
'Wilson v. Whitaker, 49 Pa. 114 (1865). Nor did it apply to breach of
contract to sell shares of stock. Ibid.
21In Musgrave v. Beckendorff, 53 Pa. 320 (1866), and Jennings v. Loeffler,
184 Pa. 318, 39 Atl. 214 (x898), the highest intermediate value rule was applied
to breach of contract to return borrowed securities. However, in the latter case
the highest value happened to be the value at time of the breach. In Persch v.
Quiggle, 57 Pa. 247 (1868), a bailee with a blank power of attorney was said to
breach his trust when he deliberately loaned the shares to a third party. The
same was held of a pledgee who deliberately sold shares in Conyngham's Appeal,
57 Pa. 474 (1868). Both the latter cases were suits in equity and the rule laid
down in Montgomery v. Reese was applied.
- Neiler v. Kelley, 69 Pa. 403 (1871) ; Work v. Bennett, 70 Pa. 484 (872).
These cases involved actions of tort for conversion of shares pledged as collateral security and there was no definite return day. The same limitation on the
rule of Montgomery v. Reese was recognized in Wagner v. Peterson, 83 Pa.
238 (1877), where the plaintiff sued in assumpsit for breach of the contract of
pledge. It was also recognized in Huntington & B. T. RR. Co. v. English, 86
Pa. 247 (1878), where the action was assumpsit for breach of contract to return
borrowed shares. In the latter case, however, the parties in the contract itself,
fixed the measure of damages as the value at the time of conversion.
I Neiler v. Kelley; Work v. Bennett, both supra note 22. These cases were
decided prior to the case of Baker v. Drake, and the court was confronted with
the alternative of either the rule of Montgomery v. Reese or the general conversion rule.
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breach.2 4 At a later date we have a third limitation of the original
Pennsylvania rule 25in that it applied to conversion only where the
act was deliberate.
Therefore the Pennsylvania decisions prior to the case of Gervis
v. Day had established the propositions, that where the conversion was
a deliberate breach of a trust duty 6 to deliver shares at a definite
time, 27 the measure of damages was the highest value between the
conversion and the trial ;28 that where there was not a trust relationship or a definite delivery date or where the conversion occurred
through an honest mistake on the part of the defendant, the measure
was the value of the shares at the time of the conversion. 2
The decision in Gervis v. Day, by adopting the highest market
value between conversion and a reasonable time after the customer
has notice of it, departs from the old Pennsylvania rule in the situation of conversion by honest mistake.3 0 It would seem that this
departure is justified in that it recognizes the fluctuating value of
shares of stock, and attempts to do justice to both parties by indemnifying the plaintiff for what he has lost and no more. Where a broker
converts shares of stock carried on margin, there are two injuries,
one being the tort of conversion, and the other a breach of the contract
between pledgee and pledgor not to sell without notice.3 1 For the
" In Wagner v. Peterson, supra note 22, the defendant broker converted
shares pledged as security and the customer waived the tort and sued in assumpsit. The measure of damages was held to be the value at the time of conversion.
Pennsylvania Co. v. P. G. & N. RR., i Pa. Dist. 3oi, aff'd 153 Pa. i6o,
25

At. 1043 (1893) ; Jamison's Estate, 163 Pa. 143,

29

Atl. ioo

('894).

the broker is not a trustee in the strict sense that he has legal title
to the shares, yet he enjoys a fiduciary capacity and has the ability to pass title
to a third party. See Persch v. Quiggle, supra note 22, at 264; Learock v. Pax'While

son, 2o8 Pa. 602, 607, 57 Atl. io97, io99 (i9o4) ; but see Jamison's Estate, supra
note 25, at i56. In Galigher v. Jones, supra note 13, at 201, 9 Sup. Ct. at 337, the

court observed that in Pennsylvania a trust relation would probably be deemed
to exist between a stock-broker and his client.
' Since the pledgor has the right to call for the shares at any time, each day
is delivery day if the pledgor so desires. See Learock v. Paxson, supra note 26,
at 6o9, 57 Atl., at

2099.

Learock v. Paxson, supra note 26. In this case the court recognized the
rule of the highest value between conversion and trial, but actually awarded a
'

smaller amount of damages. Sproul v. Sloan, 241 Pa. 284, 88 At. 501 (913);
Berberich's Estate, 264 Pa. 437, IO7 At!. 813 (1919).

'Pennsylvania Co. v. P. G. & N. RR., supra note 25. In breach of contract
to deliver at a definite date the rule appears to have been the highest intermediate
value between breach and trial. Musgrave v. Beckendorff, supra note 22.
Where there was no such delivery date the measure was the value at time of
breach. Huntington & B. T. RR. Co. v. English, supra note 22.
1 The decision in Gervis v. Day does not squarely decide a situation in which
the highest value is reached between the conversion and the plaintiff's notice of
it. There is no reason why the plaintiff should receive the benefit of this rise in
price because he gave no orders to sell at that price and allowed the shares to
decline in value after they had reached the peak. See Burnham v. Lawson, supra
note ii, at 392.
312

SEDGWICK,

op. cit. supra note 2, at

1021.
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tort the plaihtiff is entitled to compensation for the direct consequences of the act. 2 For breach of the contract of pledge, he is
entitled to probable profits.3 3 Whether the plaintiff sues in tort or
contract, the measure of damages should be the same.8 4 The amount
of his profits or consequential damages is, however, limited by the
avoidable consequence" rule which excludes as remote those damages
which could have been avoided.3 5 It seems reasonable to say the
damages are consequential within the period between notice and a
reasonable time thereafter, and remote after the expiration of that
reasonable time.
Though the decision in Gervis v. Day, which applies substantially
the New York rule, is expressly limited to conversion by honest
mistake, it is to be hoped that the rule will be extended to all cases
involving conversion of shares of stock.
J. A. S., Jr.
'

Hillsdale Coal and Coke Co. v. Penna. RR.,

229

Pa. 6i, 78 At.

28

(igo).

n Spiese v. Mutual Trust Co., 258 Pa. 414, io2 Atl. nig (1917) ; 2 SEEGWICK,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 1021.
" See McKinley v. Williams, supra note 13, at 102; Baker v. Drake, supra
note 7, at 220; 4 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 6, at 4250.
Thompson v. DeLong, 267 Pa. 212, 1io Atl. 251 (192o) (injury to property). Taber v. Porter-Gildersleeve Co., 271 Pa. 245, 114 Atl. 773 (1921)

(breach of contract).

